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Attentional bias in math anxiety
Orly Rubinsten*, Hili Eidlin, Hadas Wohl and Orly Akibli
Edmond J. Safra Brain Research Center for the Study of Learning Disabilities, Department of Learning Disabilities, University
of Haifa, Haifa, Israel
Cognitive theory from the field of general anxiety suggests that the tendency to display
attentional bias toward negative information results in anxiety. Accordingly, the current
study aims to investigate whether attentional bias is involved in math anxiety (MA)
as well (i.e., a persistent negative reaction to math). Twenty seven participants (14
with high levels of MA and 13 with low levels of MA) were presented with a novel
computerized numerical version of the well established dot probe task. One of six
types of prime stimuli, either math related or typically neutral, was presented on one
side of a computer screen. The prime was preceded by a probe (either one or two
asterisks) that appeared in either the prime or the opposite location. Participants had to
discriminate probe identity (one or two asterisks). Math anxious individuals reacted faster
when the probe was at the location of the numerical related stimuli. This suggests the
existence of attentional bias in MA. That is, for math anxious individuals, the cognitive
system selectively favored the processing of emotionally negative information (i.e., math
related words). These findings suggest that attentional bias is linked to unduly intense
MA symptoms.
Keywords: math anxiety, dot probe, attentional bias
Introduction
Mathematical skills are essential for productive functioning in our progressively more complex,
technological society. In addition, numerical development has been a focus of the continuing
theoretical debate concerning the origins of cognition and how it develops throughout one’s
lifetime. Numerical diﬃculties result in reduced educational and employment achievements, and
in increased physical and mental health costs (Woloshin et al., 2001; Parsons and Bynner, 2005;
Duncan et al., 2007; Reyna et al., 2009). Some argue that in western society, poor numeracy
is a greater handicap than poor literacy (e.g., Rivera-Batiz, 1992; Estrada et al., 2004). Hence,
mathematical skills may have an impact on social mobility and poverty levels.
However, some people ﬁnd it diﬃcult to learn arithmetic or mathematics since they suﬀer from
math anxiety (henceforth math anxiety, or MA), which is a persistent negative reaction to math,
ranging frommild discomfort to extreme avoidance (Hembree, 1990; Ma and Xu, 2004a,b; Ashcraft
and Ridley, 2005). Given the implications of MA, a systematic identiﬁcation of the vulnerability
factors that contribute to the development and maintenance of MA is crucial. But what are these
possible vulnerability factors? According to information processing theories, fear and anxiety may
be caused by diﬀerent cognitive processes, such as attention. Compared to non-anxious individuals,
anxious individuals are more likely to show an inclination to attend to threatening stimuli over
non-threatening stimuli in their environment (attentional bias) (for review see Van Bockstaele
et al., 2014). Attentional bias to threatening stimuli was found for general, but not MA. The current
study aims to ﬁll this gap.
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Math anxiety consists of feelings of tension (Richardson
and Suinn, 1972) and low self conﬁdence in one’s ability to
learn mathematics (Jain, 2009). In addition, MA can aﬀect
general cognitive abilities such as decline in working memory
(Ashcraft and Kirk, 2001). Cognitive causes may also involve
core numerical characteristics such as counting abilities (Maloney
et al., 2010), the precision of the mental number line (Maloney
et al., 2011), and poor numeracy (i.e., the ability to estimate
large quantities of items – Rubinsten and Tannock, 2010). MA
was also found to have a possible genetic (Wang et al., 2014)
and a speciﬁc neural basis (Young et al., 2012), even when only
anticipating math problems (Lyons and Beilock, 2011); this was
found in the bilateral inferior frontal junction, a brain region
known to be involved in cognitive control and reappraisal of
negative emotional responses. The more highly math anxious
individuals activated this frontoparietal network before they even
engaged in mathematics; the better they performed on a math
task.
In terms of epidemiology, recent ﬁndings show that even
children as young as the ﬁrst grade suﬀer from MA (Ramirez
et al., 2013). In addition, although there are exceptions, most
studies of MA report higher levels of MA for females than for
males (e.g., Betz, 1978; Hembree, 1990; Ashcraft and Faust, 1994;
Hopko, 2003; Ma and Cartwright, 2003; Haynes et al., 2004;
Baloglu and Kocak, 2006; McGraw et al., 2006; Jain, 2009; Else-
Quest et al., 2010). However, other studies failed to ﬁnd such
a gender diﬀerence (e.g., Cooper and Robinson, 1991). These
gender diﬀerences appear despite the fact that no diﬀerence is
typically found between genders in math knowledge and skills
(for a meta-analysis see Else-Quest et al., 2010).
Even mild levels of MA have been associated with academic
decisions (Brown et al., 2010). This may suggest that MA may
be a strong antecedent for the low visibility of women in
the science and engineering workforce. For example, despite
gender similarities in math achievements (Hedges and Nowell,
1995; Hyde et al., 2008; Else-Quest et al., 2010) or even better
math grades for females compared to males (Kenney-Benson
et al., 2006), in the US women constitute only 28% of the
science and engineering workforce (correct for the year of
2010 – National Science Foundation, 2013). Women are also
severely underrepresented in math-intensive ﬁelds (Ceci and
Williams, 2011). Hence, as our society becomes progressively
more dependent on math, failure to acquire numerical skills may
increasingly act as a ﬁlter, preventing occupational success for
men but mainly for women (e.g., Halpern et al., 2007). Thismakes
it a very good reason to study MA.
The current study aims to investigate the cognitive source of
MA. It is still quite rare to see cognitive neuroscience research
take into account issues of MA, and only scant attention has been
devoted to the antecedents of MA. By suggesting the role played
by anxiety in numerical situations, scientists and clinicians will be
better able to provide cognitive models of both MA vulnerability
and math dysfunction.
As mentioned above, the antecedents and epidemiology of
MA are still being studied and results are inconclusive. One
variable that might be related to diﬀerent ﬁndings regarding
MA is the common use of explicit tools such as the MA rating
scale (e.g., Richardson and Suinn, 1972), the MA questionnaire
(Wigﬁeld andMeece, 1988) (for a German version see Krinzinger
et al., 2007), the abbreviated math anxiety scale (AMAS: Hopko
et al., 2003), or the revised Math Anxiety Rating Scale (MARS-
R: Alexander and Martray, 1989; Hopko, 2003) to diagnose MA.
Such explicit tools typically assess accessible self representations.
However, women, for example, have been found to score
higher than men on self-report measures of trait anxiety (e.g.,
Feingold, 1994; Costa et al., 2001; Egloﬀ and Schmukle, 2004),
possibly resulting from gender diﬀerences in anxiety that are not
due to anxiety per se. That is, gender diﬀerences in explicit self-
report questionnaires could be the result of greater willingness
of women to disclose personal attitudes (Ashcraft, 2002). Indeed,
Flessati and Jamieson (1991) argued that gender diﬀerences in
MA could be explained by the fact that females are more self-
critical of their performance.
Implicit measures, on the other hand, typically assess
inaccessible cognitive structures or representations that are
processed automatically. It has been shown that aﬀective
traits can be activated automatically and inﬂuence emotional,
cognitive, and behavioral processes (e.g., Giner-Sorolla et al.,
1999) even in the case of MA (Rubinsten et al., 2012). That is,
aﬀective processing begins immediately and even involuntarily
upon seeing a salient aﬀective word or picture (for review see
Rubinsten, 2015).
Thus, one of our primary objectives is to investigate cognitive
characteristics of MA, and speciﬁcally attentional bias, by using a
novel attention bias task as an indirect measure.
Math anxiety has been found to be positively, albeit
moderately, correlated with general, state, and trait anxiety
(Ashcraft and Moore, 2009). General anxiety is traditionally
classiﬁed into two distinct components, “trait” and “state.” While
trait anxiety refers to relatively stable individual diﬀerences
in anxiety proneness, state anxiety is a transitory emotional
condition (Spielberger and Spielberger, 1966). Mathematics
anxiety is conceptualized as a situation (i.e., trait) speciﬁc anxiety
that manifests itself in mathematics-related environments (e.g.,
Baloglu, 1999). These similarities between general and MA, may
suggest that the cognitive traits that are associated with general
anxiety, such as the tendency to ruminate over negative thoughts
and stressful situations (Donaldson et al., 2007) or the tendency
to display attentional bias toward negative information (Bar-
Haim et al., 2007), are involved not only in general anxiety but
also in MA. Interestingly, and to the best of our knowledge,
contemporary scientiﬁc approaches have not availed themselves
of this insight, which suggests a link between the cognitive
symptoms of general andMA. Accordingly, here we wish to focus
on attentional bias in MA via an implicit and novel cognitive
tool.
Rumination is deﬁned as repetitive thinking about negative
personal concerns and/or about the implications and causes of
a negative mood (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). Indeed, the
tendency to ruminate has been associated with self-reported
symptoms of generalized anxiety (Fresco et al., 2002; Harrington
and Blankenship, 2002), post-traumatic stress (Nolen-Hoeksema
and Morrow, 1991; Clohessy and Ehlers, 1999; Mayou et al.,
2002), and social anxiety (Mellings and Alden, 2000).
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Rumination aﬀects the ability to remain attentive to the task at
hand due to obsessive thoughts over negative feelings (Donaldson
et al., 2007). Reese et al. (2010) have suggested that attentional
bias to negative information is linked to the repetitive negative
thinking characteristic of anxious rumination and worry. Indeed,
rumination and attentional bias have been linked to stress and
to each other (e.g., Bradley et al., 1997; Beevers and Carver,
2003; Mogg and Bradley, 2005). Morrison and O’Connor (2008)
even suggested a causal relationship in which rumination aﬀects
attentional bias. Hence, clinically anxious patients have been
shown to display attentional bias toward negative information
(Bar-Haim et al., 2007). It has been suggested that biased patterns
of information processing (such as rumination and attentional
bias) operate within the cognitive system at a very early stage and
hence, are unreachable to awareness and play a central causal role
in susceptibility to experiencing overly intense general anxiety
symptoms (Mathews and MacLeod, 2005). Another approach
concerning the link between anxiety and attention is described
by the attentional control theory suggested by Eysenck et al.
(2007). According to the attentional control theory, the anxiety
state is capable of increasing the allocation of attention to threat
related stimuli. That is, anxiety typically reduces attentional focus
on a current task unless it involves threatening stimuli; or in
other words anxiety impairs attentional control. Therefore, we
aim to examine attentional bias in MA and to suggest that it
is attentional bias that leads to unduly intense MA symptoms
and to damage to information processing (i.e., solving math
problems). This suggestion of ours, is based on cognitive theory
from the ﬁeld of general anxiety (Beck et al., 1979), which posits
that certain cognitive vulnerabilities (such as attentional bias),
when ‘activated’ by stressful or negative life events, result in
psychological distress.
Attentional bias has been assessed in various ways. One
technique is the visual probe task, in which stimuli that diﬀer in
their emotional tone are brieﬂy exposed on a computer screen
before a visual probe appears in the locus where one or another
emotional stimuli were exposed (Koster et al., 2006; Colin et al.,
2007). Participants must quickly discriminate probe identity.
Typically, responses are found to be faster when probes appear
in the locus of negative stimuli. Hence, attentional bias in the
dot probe task could arise from fast responding in congruent
trials (attentional engagement to threat), slow responding in
incongruent trials (slow attentional disengagement away from
threat), or a combination of both (e.g., Koster et al., 2004). Such
a pattern of results provides an index of selective attention to
negative or threatening information. This dot probe task has
showed attentional bias to negative stimuli in both clinical and
non-clinical expressions of anxiety (Cisler and Koster, 2010).
The purposes of the current study are to strengthen MA
assessment (i.e., by using an implicit instead of an explicit tool)
and to focus on attention bias in MA. For that, we developed
a novel computerized numerical version of the well established
dot probe task (MacLeod et al., 1986), which has been proven
to be a highly reliable tool in the assessment and even treatment
of general anxiety (e.g., Baert et al., 2010). We hypothesized that
math anxious individuals would react faster when the probe is
at the location of the threat/numerical related prime (e.g., based
on Bar-Haim, 2010). That is, as in the typical dot probe task,
faster reaction times (RTs) when probes appear in the locus of
numerical primes, will point to selective attention to negative
information (i.e., attentional bias in MA).
Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty-eight adults participated in the study (nine males, mean
age = 26.44 years, SD = 4.61). One female participant was
excluded due to missing data. All participants were recruited
through advertisements distributed on a university campus. All
participants gave their written consent to participate in the
experiment and were paid about 10USD for their participation.
The recruitment, payment, task, and overall procedure were
authorized by the research ethics committee of the university.
Classification and Assessments Criteria
Participants were sorted into groups of MA as follows: high math
anxiety (HMA) or low math anxiety (LMA), based on their score
on the MARS-R questionnaire (Plake and Parker, 1982). The
cut-oﬀ threshold for inclusion was a score below (for the LMA
group) or above (for the HMA group) 72 points, which was the
group median score. An independent t-test yielded signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between HMAs (14 participants of whom 4 were
males, M = 83.4, SD = 10.83) and LMAs (13 participants of
whom ﬁve were males, M = 57.9, SD = 11.8) on the MARS-R
scores [T(25) = 5.8, p < 0.001]. It is interesting to note that no
gender diﬀerence was found in theMARS-R scores [T(24) = −1.1,
n.s.].
The Experimental Tasks and Stimuli
The novel numerical dot probe task
Stimuli
A novel dot probe task was created for the experiment, based
on the method of the well established dot probe task initially
developed by MacLeod et al. (1986). A prime stimuli, either math
related (a math equation such as 26 + 65 or a math word such as
“quantity”) or typically neutral (a word with neutral valence such
as “table”), are presented on one side of a computer screen, and
are then preceded by a probe (either one or two asterisks “∗”) that
appears in either the prime location (congruent) or the opposite
location (incongruent). Participants must quickly discriminate
probe identity (one or two asterisks) and then preform a task
regarding the prime stimuli.
One of six types of primes appeared on either the left or
right side of the computer screen. There were four diﬀerent
equation levels. Accordingly, the prime could be either a single
digit arithmetic equation (e.g., 8–4), a double digit (e.g., 52+ 16),
a triple digit (e.g., 536/268), or a power equation (e.g., 92 × 35),
math word (e.g., number), or neutral word (e.g., pencil).
Each equation level (i.e., single, double, triple digit, or power)
contained four pairs of numbers (e.g., 8 and 4). Each pair
of numbers produced four trials: each type of these trials
involved one of the four basic operations: addition, subtraction,
multiplication, or division (e.g., the pair 8 and 4 produced the
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equations 8 + 4, 8 − 4, 8∗4, and 8/4). There were three major
rules for pair matching: (1) Each pair of numbers was chosen
based on numerical length (either single, double, or triple digits).
(2) One number in each pair was a multiplication of the other.
(3) Digit frequency (1–9) was controlled across all numerical
combinations (for a detailed list of the numbers, see Appendix 1).
The word stimuli consisted of 16 math related words and 16
neutral words. All words were chosen based on their frequency
and emotional load. Frequency levels and emotional load were
tested by a short questionnaire distributed online (by Google
form document) to 58 university students. For each item
participants were asked how familiars the word on a 9 point
Likert scale (1- not familiar, 9- very familiar) and how frightening
is the word on a 9 point Likert scale (1- not frightening at all, 9-
very frightening). The words were also matched by their length,
i.e., number of letters (for detailed information see Appendix 1).
The prime appeared on a black background and was
positioned on one side of the computer screen at a 3.81◦
(short stimuli) – 16.84◦ (long stimuli) visual angle (VA; VA was
calculated using the following formula: θ = 2 tan−1( s2d ) where d
is the distance between the participant’s eye and the screen and s
is the size of the object on the screen).
The prime presentation was followed by a probe identiﬁcation
task. The probe was either one (i.e., ∗) or two asterisks
(i.e., ∗∗).The probe could appear on the same side previously
occupied by the prime (i.e., congruent trial) or on the opposite
side (i.e., incongruent trial). In order to avoid visual bias, the
probe’s exact location was chosen randomly, so it could appear
at seven diﬀerent locations on each side of the screen, matching
all possible locations previously occupied by the prime (either
by the numbers of the math equation or the letters of the
words). Participants were asked to determine if there were one
or two asterisks (ﬁrst task – see Figure 1). Following the probe
identiﬁcation task, and after the participant responded to the
probe, the probe disappeared and either a number (after math
equation prime) or a word (after word prime) appeared in the
center of the computer screen. Participants were asked (second
task) to determine whether the number was the correct answer
to the previously presented equation (i.e., prime) or not. In
cases of word prime trials, participants had to determine, in
this second task, whether the word that appeared in the center
of the screen rhymed with the previous word or not. This
second task was presented in order to make sure that participants
indeed processed the prime and to create meaningful math
stimuli.
Procedure
Each trial in our numerical dot probe task began with a white
colored square shaped ﬁxation point, presented for 750 ms
and followed by a blank screen presented for 100 ms. Then,
a prime appeared on either the left or the right side of the
screen and remained for 1000 ms. Next, there was an inter
stimulus interval (ISI) of 100–150 ms (the exact ISI changed in
between stimuli to avoid participant prediction of the stimuli’s
appearance for similar rationale and ISI see e.g., Posner and Boies,
1971). Afterward, a small probe (one or two asterisks) appeared
either on the side previously occupied by the prime (congruent
trial) or on the opposite side of the screen (incongruent trial).
Participants were instructed to determine whether one or two
asterisks appeared on the computer screen by pressing one
FIGURE 1 | Examples of stimuli in the numerical dot probe task.
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of two optional keys on the keyboard (the numbers 1, 2).
Half of the participants were asked to use their right hand to
respond and half used their left hand. The probes remained
on the computer screen until the participant responded or for
3000 ms. Then a number or a word appeared in the center
of the screen (task 2 – see Figure 1) and participants had to
determine whether the number/word was the correct answer to
the equation/rhymed with the previous word or not and to press
a matching key on the keyboard (1 for correct answer and 2
for wrong answer). After responding or after 4000 ms a black
screen appeared and remained for 1500 ms (for illustration of the
trials see Figure 1). Following this period of time, the next trial
began.
The task contained six blocks, each comprised of one sample
of each stimuli type (four equation levels, math related and
neutral words). In order to avoid ongoing stress levels, each block
was followed by a 1 min break, during which an aquarium ﬁlm
appeared on the computer screen. Overall, the task consisted of
96 trials and lasted about 45 min.
The Revised Mathematics Anxiety Rating Scale
Participants answered a Hebrew translated computerized version
of the MARS-R (Plake and Parker, 1982), which is a shortened
version of theMARS questionnaire (Richardson and Suinn, 1972)
containing 24 items. We created the computerized version using
an online Google form document, completed by participants after
performing the experimental task. The computerized version
allowed us, among other things, to make sure that participants
did not miss any questions.
The questionnaire was designed to reﬂect the degree of anxiety
experienced in a variety of math related tasks and situations,
based on 5-point Likert scale (1- not nervous at all to 5- very
nervous). In order to obtain the total score, we simply summed up
the scores for all questions. Since the literature does not set a clear
threshold that represents HMA levels and based on the methods
of previous studies, a median score of 72 points and higher
(obtained by giving a rating of 3 or higher for each question) was
chosen as representing HMA levels.
Results
Probe Identification Task (Task 1) – Accuracy
Rates
Accuracy rates for the probe identiﬁcation task were very high
following all types of primes (single digits: M = 0.97, SD = 0.05;
double digits: M = 0.96, SD = 0.04; triple digits: M = 0.96,
SD = 0.07; powers: M = 0.98, SD = 0.04; math word: M = 0.96,
SD = 0.05; neutral word:M = 0.94, SD = 0.06).
Solution Task (Task 2) – Accuracy Rates
Mean accuracy rates for deciding whether the number presented
is the correct solution of the prime (i.e., task 2; see Figure 1)
was very low in both the power (40%) and triple digit (30%)
equations. Mean accuracy rates of all the other equations and
words were higher than 80%. Since our aim was to have all
participants mentally process the prime and to make sure that the
primes contain meaningful math stimuli, we did not analyze the
triple and power equation. This was done under the assumption
that at some point participants ignored the triple digit and the
power equation, as they were too diﬃcult or complicated to solve
mentally.
We then conducted two-way repeated measures ANOVA on
the prime accuracy rates (task 2). This analysis included the
Anxiety group (HMA or LMA) as the between-subject factor and
Prime type (i.e., single digits, double digits, math word, neutral
word) as the within-subject factor.
There was neither signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the groups
(F < 7) in accuracy rates nor interaction between Group and
Prime type.
Solution Task (Task 2) – Reaction Time
There was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the groups (F < 10)
in RTs nor interaction between Group and Prime type.
Dot Probe Analysis – Reaction Time
A four-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the
probe’s mean RTs. This analysis included the Anxiety group
(HMA or LMA) as the between-subject factor and Prime
type (i.e., single digits, double digits, math word, neutral
word), Congruency (prime and probe congruent, vs. prime and
probe incongruent), and Operation (i.e., addition, subtraction,
multiplication, and division) as within-subject factors.
Only trials, in which the probe was correctly identiﬁed, were
analyzed.
Because Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity indicated that circularity
could not be assumed, all of the following F-statistics are adjusted
by the Greenhouse-Geisser correction.
The results revealed amain eﬀect of Prime type [F(3,69) = 31.8,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.55], such that RTs for probes presented after
single digit equations were faster (M = 841.9, SD = 49) than
after double digit equations (M = 958.4, SD = 51.8) and both
were slower than probes presented after neutral words, which
were processed faster (M = 689.4, SD = 35.5) than math words
(M = 748, SD = 46.2). No other main eﬀects were evident (e.g.,
main eﬀect of Group F < 8 not signiﬁcant).
The triple interaction between Group × Type × Congruency
was signiﬁcant [F(3,69) = 3.77, p = 0.05, η2 = 0.16]
(see Figure 2). We further conducted simple interactions of
Group × Congruency separately for math related probes (i.e.,
single and double digits and math words).
Math Related Probes
The simple interaction between Group and Congruency was
signiﬁcant [F(1,25) = 4.1, p = 0.05, η2 = 0.14]. The simple
main eﬀect of congruency was signiﬁcant in the HMA group
[F(1,13) = 31.8, p> 0.001], indicating that congruent probes were
processed signiﬁcantly faster (M = 723 ms) than incongruent
probes (M = 925 ms). This simple main eﬀect of congruency was
not signiﬁcant in the LMA group.
Neutral Words
The simple interaction between Group and Congruency was not
signiﬁcant.
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FIGURE 2 | Mean reaction times (RTs) of type of probe and congruency as a function of group (significant interaction between Group, Probe, and
Congruency). SD, single digit equations; DD, double digit equations; MW, math words; NW, neutral words. Cong, congruent (i.e., probe and prime are presented at
the same location); InCong, incongruent (i.e., probe and prime are presented at opposite locations). Error bars denote the standard error of the mean.
It is interesting to note that when analyzing the simple
interaction of Group × Congruency in math words only, the
interaction was signiﬁcant [F(1,25) = 4.2, p = 0.017, η2 = 0.14].
The simple main eﬀect of congruency was marginally signiﬁcant
in the HMA group [F(1,13) = 2.09, p = 0.17], indicating that
congruent probes were processed faster (M = 627 ms) than
incongruent probes (M = 814 ms). This simple main eﬀect of
congruency was not signiﬁcant in the LMA group.
In an additional diﬀerent analysis we looked at MA scores as a
continuum. Speciﬁcally, in the current analysis we correlated MA
scores (MARS) with the mean congruency eﬀect (incongruent –
congruent) for the math related trials. This correlation was found
to be signiﬁcant and positive [r = 0.4, p < 0.05], indicating that
the higher the MA the larger the eﬀect.
Discussion
The appearance of biases in the cognitive processes of individuals
with general anxiety has been highlighted as a distinction of the
etiology, maintenance, and treatment of anxiety disorders (Beck
and Clark, 1997). Speciﬁcally, there is accumulating evidence
that anxiety is associated with a bias in early preattentive
processes that are likely to be involved in initial orienting of
attention toward threat stimuli. How do we go about linking
this characteristic to the cognitive proﬁle that deﬁnes MA? We
identiﬁed here two possible accounts for clarifying the cognitive
status of MA: (1) math is associated with negative valence,
and (2) attentional bias is related to numerical information.
Broadly speaking, these claims respectively indicate that for
math anxious individuals, math related stimuli such as math
words or math equations are cognitively or aﬀectively linked
with threatening and negative valence (Rubinsten and Tannock,
2010; Rubinsten et al., 2012). Accordingly, for math anxious
individuals, the cognitive system selectively favors the processing
of emotionally negative information (e.g., math related words).
Though not directly measuring selective attention to numerical
information, the previous ﬁndings of Rubinsten and Tannock
(2010) and Rubinsten et al. (2012) pointed to selective attention
to negative information and support current ﬁndings. Indeed,
current ﬁndings show, as in the typical dot probe task, faster
RTs in HMAs, when probes appear in the locus of the numerical
prime (i.e., either single and double digit equations or math
words). Such a congruency pattern (i.e., faster RTs for congruent
than for incongruent trials) was not found in the case of neutral
word primes; or at least, high math anxious individuals processed
neutral words similar to low MA individuals. It is important to
note that there was no signiﬁcant main eﬀect of RT between the
two groups; HMAswas not generally slower. Moreover, there was
no signiﬁcant main eﬀect of accuracy levels between the groups
either for detecting the probe or for solving the math equations.
Hence, HMAs did not show lower performance and did not need
additional time in order to solve the tasks. That is, the longer time
it took the HMA group to locate the congruent probe (compared
to the incongruent) is due to the threatening aﬀect associated
with the math equation and not since these equations were too
complicated to solve.
Several authors have tried to further diﬀerentiate between
diﬀerent components of attention (engagement, disengagement,
and shifting – see Posner and Petersen, 1990) in the dot probe
task (Koster et al., 2004, 2006; Salemink et al., 2007). However,
and since the measurement of the separate components has been
previously challenged, there is general agreement that the dot
probe task is a useful measure of attentional bias as a single entity
that includes all of these components. Hence, and because the
focus of our study is attentional bias as a single entity in MA,
we cannot reach a conclusion about the diﬀerent components
of attention. However, the long presentation time of the prime
in the current study (1000 ms) may suggest that math anxious
individuals show a general bias in cognitive processing, and
hence, once their attention has settled on a threatening numerical
stimulus, they have successive diﬃculty in disengaging it.
Speciﬁcally, Bradley et al. (1998) examined biases in initial
shifting versus maintenance of attention, by manipulating the
exposure duration of the threatening prime stimulus. Their
results indicated that the attentional bias for threat was
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between the two diﬀerent exposure
durations (500 and 1250 ms). Given that the duration of 1250 ms
in Bradley’s study and 1000 ms in the current study potentially
allow multiple shifts of attention, our results (based on the
ﬁndings of Bradley et al., 1998) may suggest that attentional
bias in anxiety operates in both initial orienting and in the
maintenance of attention – math anxious individuals do not
disengage attention from the negative stimulus. This view is
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compatible with Beck’s (1979) model, which suggests that
anxiety related biases favoring threat stimuli operate on both
attentional levels (i.e., initial orienting and maintenance of
attention).
Attentional bias allows the cognitive system to prioritize
speciﬁc stimuli for processing. Accordingly, responding to threats
may in fact facilitate survival and learning. For example,
mammals tend to learn mainly about those aspects of the
environment to which they attend (for review see Shechner
et al., 2012). Following this line of logic, it would be expected
that math anxious individuals, who present attentional bias
toward numerical contents, will show better learning curves
and better math performance. This is of course not the case.
We show no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in accuracy rates between
high and low math anxious individuals, and previous studies
have shown low math performance in MA (e.g., Maloney
et al., 2010; Rubinsten and Tannock, 2010). Accordingly, it
may be suggested, although not directly studied here, that
attentional bias is related to rumination, which directly impacts
performance and signiﬁcantly aﬀects individuals’ ability to
remain attentive to the task at hand (Donaldson et al., 2007).
Indeed, Reese et al. (2010) suggested that attentional bias
to negative information may be the factor that contributes
to the pattern of distressing and repetitive negative thinking
that characterizes anxious rumination and worry. Accordingly
attentional bias and rumination in the case of MA, suggest
constant obsessive thoughts over negative feelings related tomath
and the stress that mathematical problems cause, consequently
turning attention away from the ways in which one can actually
solve these problems (Ashcraft and Moore, 2009; Beilock and
Ramirez, 2011).
It is important to note that, due to methodological limitations,
the vital question of causality (between attentional bias and
MA) cannot be answered here. This causality question is
nevertheless crucial, not only from a scientiﬁc perspective but
also from a clinical perspective. If cognitive and, speciﬁcally,
attentional biases are causally involved in the development of
MA, then therapeutic interventions should aim to reduce these
cognitive biases to prevent or reduce the individual’s level of
anxiety.
There are some additional limitations in the current study,
such as small sample size or no information on general anxiety
levels. However, the signiﬁcant triple interaction between group,
congruency, and type of equation may suggest that sample
size was suﬃcient to answer the current research question.
Importantly, though, it should be noted that participants in the
current study were divided into high vs. low MA groups using
a median split. Some argue that a median split to dichotomize
the scores may not be the most valid method of assessing high
or low levels of participants (Waller and Meehl, 1998). Hence, it
might be claimed that our group selection criteria may not be the
best to answer current research questions. This indeed might be
the case and could be considered a limitation and yet it should
be mentioned that several other studies in the ﬁeld of MA used
a similar criterion for diﬀerent tests (e.g., 2 working memory
groups, Beilock and DeCaro, 2007; Ramirez et al., 2015).
Conclusion
The current ﬁndings show that math anxious individuals shift
their attention toward numerical stimuli, which for them are
associated with negative and threatening valence. That is, this
study strongly implicates biased processing of threats in the
maintenance of MA. Attention is highly relevant for several other
cognitive processes, such as memory and other forms of learning.
Hence, the study of attention biases appears particularly pertinent
to MA research, as attention aﬀects learning and, speciﬁcally,
math learning.
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